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ABSTRACT 
Sofie Senecal: The Rise of National Security Restrictions on FDI in the EU 
(Under the direction of John D. Stephens) 
 Across the past two decades, 75% of EU member states have established or tightened 
security restrictions on inbound Foreign Direct Investment (IFDI). Increased restrictions on IFDI 
not only are a startling change for the bloc, which was built on decades of trade liberalization, 
but also defy the predictions of the consensus in the international political economy literature, 
which holds that developed countries will want to attract more IFDI.  
 This first part of this paper introduces a novel coding scheme that transforms two decades 
of national laws in all 28 member states into an internationally-comparable measure of IFDI 
restrictiveness: the Security Restrictiveness Index, which enables detailed analysis of the cross-
national emergence of increased restrictions on IFDI in the EU. The second part of the paper 
explores potential explanations for the policy shift and finds strong preliminary quantitative 
evidence for the impact of Chinese investment on Europeans’ policy shift on IFDI.  
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THE RISE OF NATIONAL SECURITY RESTRICTIONS ON FDI IN THE EU 
Introduction 
 The past two decades have seen unprecedented trade liberalization worldwide (Thomsen 
and Mistura 2017). However, in the same period, 21 EU member states have introduced or 
tightened their regulatory restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in the interest of 
national security. In 2019, the EU passed a regulation on FDI which encourages stricter national 
policies and aims to coordinate cooperation between member states. In the context of the 
political economy literature on FDI, this is strange. As this is a relatively new development, it is 
still relatively unexplored. This paper contributes a detailed analysis of this policy shift, 
highlighting an emerging issue at the intersection of security and trade policy.  Furthermore, it 1
discusses potential causes driving this policy shift, suggesting key lines of inquiry for future 
studies and other subfields. First, however, I overview key background information on FDI.  
 FDI, by definition, necessitates a long-term, significant relationship between the investor 
and the enterprise, in which the investor’s main motivation is to influence (to a lesser or greater 
extent) the management of the enterprise (OECD 2009). The long term, managerial nature of this 
kind of investment separates FDI from other kinds of international capital flows, like portfolio 
investment. FDI can be measured in relation to the sending country (the country of origin) in 
which case it is called outbound or outward FDI (OFDI). Alternatively, FDI can be measured and 
 I explored this in more detail in an earlier work: Senecal, Sofie (2020) “The Overlap of Trade 1
and Security Policy: Changing priorities and the case of FDI in the EU.” Unpublished paper, 
Gothenburg University, Department of Political Science. 
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discussed in terms of the receiving country (the host state), in which case it is called inbound or 
inward FDI (IFDI). This paper exclusively considers IFDI in the EU, which I also call FDI in 
Europe or FDI in the EU.  2
 There are two types of FDI: greenfield investments (GI) and mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). GI occurs when an existing enterprise establishes a new branch, subsidiary, or 
manufacturing plant in the host country. The parent enterprise and its (foreign) ownership must 
have at least some managerial control over the new enterprise. Mergers occur when two 
companies — one foreign and one domestic — merge, creating a new company with some 
foreign ownership. Acquisitions occur when a foreign company purchases (and absorbs) a 
domestic company. In both GI and M&A, a foreign owner must control at least 10% of the 
company’s voting shares to be considered foreign direct investment. While GI investments made 
up the majority of IFDI in Europe in the early 2000s, M&As have become increasingly popular. 
In 2016, M&As made up over 75% of total IFDI stocks in the EU (Carril-Caccia and Pavlova 
2018). While the two kinds of FDI are sometimes regulated differently and often studied 
separately, this paper, for the most part, considers the two in aggregate.  
 In the economics and international political economy literature, there is a broad 
consensus that FDI in general is one of the best forms of investment for the host country (Golub 
2003, Jensen 2006, Harding and Javorcik 2011). Foreign direct investment encourages a long-
term relationship between a firm and its foreign investor(s), so FDI tends to be more stable than 
other forms of international capital flows. FDI also generates many positive externalities — 
benefits that extend to the host country as a whole (Graham and Krugman 1995, Cipollina et al. 
 Likewise, when I say “FDI from China” or “Chinese FDI,” I am referring to OFDI. 2
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2012). Much of the literature about the political economy of FDI deals with the determinants of 
OFDI flows and the ways in which countries and regions compete to attract more IFDI (Jensen et 
al. 2012). Implicit in this body of research is the idea that attracting more FDI is unquestionably 
in the best interest of the host country. 
 However, not all economists believe FDI is universally beneficial. Much of the literature 
concerning opposition to FDI is centered around developing countries, many of whom 
completely banned IFDI for much of the twentieth century out of fears that foreign capital would 
usher in “a new and more pernicious form of neocolonialism” (Jensen et al. 2012: 1-2). The 
political economy literature tends to be less critical of FDI that flows to developed countries. 
That being said, there has been plenty of anti-globalization rhetoric within developed countries. 
Some argue that multinational corporations (some of the foremost foreign direct investors 
globally) exacerbate income inequality, create monopolies, or erode the power of organized labor 
(see, eg., Li and Reuveny 2003; Korten 2001; Klien 2000). In Europe and the US, domestic 
political opposition to FDI tends to focus on its perceived negative impact on local employment, 
domestic producers, the integrity of the domestic political process (Golub 2003).  
 Graham and Krugman (1995) argue that the claim that FDI has a net effect on domestic 
unemployment in developed countries is “fundamentally mistaken” (60). Likewise, according to 
traditional capitalist logic, the competition engendered by foreign firms should benefit domestic 
industry — and the host country — in the long term. Graham and Krugman (1995) also argue, 
regarding the integrity of the domestic political process, there is no reason that lobbying by 
foreign-owned firms should be more dangerous to the country than domestic lobbying. 
3
 Many have argued that IFDI, particularly in certain critical sectors, presents a risk to 
national security. The general rationale is that allowing nationals of a foreign state to access and 
control sensitive technology or critical infrastructure exposes the host state to risk. In the case of 
a war or military conflict, there is the risk of a “fifth column” of uncooperative or outright hostile 
firms (Graham and Krugman 1995). Even in peacetime, there is the risk of surveillance, 
sabotage, and the theft or export of sensitive information (Bickenback and Wan-Hsin 2018). 
Some argue that foreign nationals may have higher incentives to commit these crimes, although 
this is contested. Graham and Krugman (1995), for example, are quick to point out that there has 
never been a shortage of local citizens willing to commit espionage. Foreign investors may feel 
immune to the consequences of any illegal behavior. For example, in many cases, it is more 
difficult to prosecute foreign investors if they violate the laws of the host country because a 
foreign investor may not be physically present and their country of residence may not cooperate 
with an investigation.  
 However, these alleged national security risks are difficult to empirically verify, in large 
part because the information of specific cases is highly sensitive. Companies and nations, for 
obvious reasons, do not want to divulge instances where national security has been 
compromised. Furthermore, FDI may indirectly expose the host state to the risk of economic 
dependence, if a significant amount of IFDI comes from a single country of origin. Whether this 
counts as a security threat depends on the breadth of one’s definition of security. I discuss this 
risk in greater detail later in the paper.  
 Overall, I have two major goals in this paper. First, I will demonstrate that the increased 
skepticism about IFDI in Europe empirically exists by tracing the emergence of increased 
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security restrictions on inbound FDI in the EU in the past two decades. Second, I will explore 
potential causes of this issue. My primary hypothesis is that increases in Chinese FDI in Europe 
alongside an increase in the pseudo-adversarial status of China is the primary driver of EU 
countries’ new wariness. However, I also explore alternative hypotheses drawn from the 
literature on varieties of capitalism and literature on outbound FDI.  
 The first part of this paper is devoted to the first goal. In it, I demonstrate the existence of 
the increase in security restrictions through a novel IFDI Security Regulations Index. I also 
explain and analyze the EU’s 2019 FDI Screening Regulation. In the second part, I introduce 
several hypotheses for the cause of the policy shift and present both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence, including a random-effects regression model.  
The development of IFDI security policies in the EU 
 Before I analyze the reasons behind the policy change, I must first demonstrate that the 
change in policy is real. In this section of the paper, I will provide a general history of FDI policy 
in the EU and explain how IFDI security policy works. Then, I will introduce a quantitative 
measure of this policy change, the IFDI Security Restrictions Index, and analyze the information 
it provides about the state of IFDI security regulations across the EU. Finally, I turn my attention 
to the EU’s 2019 regulation on IFDI screening, explaining how it interfaces with the national 
polices and discussing its significance.  
 The encouragement of cross-national economic ties has been an important pillar of the 
European integration process for its entire history. Thus, the EU and its predecessors have a long 
history of policies that encourage IFDI (Carril-Caccia and Pavlova 2018). Indeed, low barriers to 
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investment are one of the foundational ideals of the EU and have significantly contributed the 
EU’s status as the number one destination for FDI worldwide (European Commission, 2020a). 
While the United States has a long history of skepticism towards foreign ownership in certain 
sectors (Graham and Krugman 1995), the countries of the EU lack this history. Indeed, for most 
EU member states, security concerns were not a driving factor in the development of their FDI 
policies (Meunier 2014). However, within the past decade, the dialogue around IFDI in Europe 
has changed. Concerns about national security and the risks of extra-EU investment, particularly 
in high-technology and energy sectors, have become increasingly prevalent. 
 Although the contemporary EU was largely built on free trade between member states, 
FDI was not an area of Union competence until the Lisbon Treaty. In one of its most significant 
changes, (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2017), the Lisbon Treaty included FDI in the scope of the 
Common Commercial Policy (TFEU Articles 206-207), an area where the EU holds exclusive 
competence (TEU Article 4). The seizure of competence over FDI by the European Commission 
was swift and uncontested (Meunier 2017), which serves as a testament to the generally 
uncontroversial nature of FDI at the time.  
 Nevertheless, even though FDI is an area of exclusive EU competence, member states 
have the legal right to enact their own provisions for national security. Article 5 of the TEU states 
that the Union must “respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, 
national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.” Thus, member states do 
have the authority to make laws restricting IFDI for security reasons, although the limits of 
member state competence has yet to be determined. Security restrictions on IFDI are a new 
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development for Europe, so the precise legal boundary where member state competence ends and 
Union competence begins will continue to develop as the policy area matures. 
 There are two predominant strategies states use to address the security concerns from 
inbound FDI. The first option is high barriers to all foreign investors, which discourages all IFDI. 
This is the policy which most of the developing world pursued for much of the twentieth century 
(Jensen et al. 2012). However, the EU prides itself on having an open investment environment. 
The barriers to investment in Europe are very low, far below the OECD average (Carril-Caccia 
and Pavlova 2018). Thus, an outright ban on all foreign investment is out of the question for EU 
member states. 
 The alternative strategy is to only restrict investors’ activities in high risk cases. This 
strategy centers on a risk assessment process that typically has a two-part structure. First, there is 
an initial review to check for theoretical risk. In the case of an ad hoc system, this is where the 
executive (or other body) chooses to examine a certain case. In a formalized screening system, 
this is an initial set of criteria that classifies a transaction as potentially risky, such as a list of 
sensitive sectors or companies. After the primary review, there is a secondary review to ascertain 
the real risk that this transaction presents to the national security of the country. This involves a 
detailed investigation of the investor as well as considerations about what information or 
infrastructure the new investor could gain access to. In most countries, the precise criteria for the 
secondary review is secret.  
 If the review body finds persuasive evidence of risk, the government can take action to 
mitigate the risk or forbid the investment. Because this system is designed to only affect certain 
high-risk transactions, it is less discouraging to overall investment than a blanket ban on IFDI. 
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All of the member states in Europe who have an explicit FDI security policy follow this risk-
management strategy. In some countries, high risk cases are identified and evaluated by a 
formalized system, and in others, the process is more informal and ad hoc, but the shared 
strategic foundation allows for cross-national policy comparison. In the next section, I introduce 
the mechanism I developed to formalize this policy analysis.  
The IFDI Security Regulations Index 
 The OECD’s May 2020 research note “Acquisition- and ownership-related policies to 
safeguard essential security interests” reviews the FDI security policies of 62 countries. Although 
it discusses policy trends across countries, it stops short of a clear cross-national comparison. 
Also, it does not cover all EU countries. Thus, I decided to create my own dataset, employing a 
novel coding scheme to create an IFDI Security Regulations Index (SRI). The SRI is designed to 
function as a simple metric to facilitate cross-national comparison of restrictions on IFDI due to 
national security interests. Drawing on the policy review in OECD 2020, I identified five 
dimensions of restrictions on FDI due to national security. The sum of a country’s scores across 
all dimensions will provide a rough estimate of how restrictive their IFDI security policy system 
was in a given year. 
 The SRI follows some precedent. The OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index uses 
four dimensions (foreign equity limits, screening and approval mechanisms, restrictions on 
foreign personnel, and other restrictions) to give countries a numerical score, ranging from 0 to 
1, which represents their overall restrictions on FDI (Kalinova, Palerm, and Thomson 2010). 
Unfortunately, it explicitly excludes restrictions due to national security interests (Kalinova et al. 
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2010). In 2017, a briefing by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) includes a 
table which notes whether or not each member state had a formal FDI scrutiny procedure, 
whether review was conducted formally or on a case by case basis, and whether any non-defense 
sectors were included (Grieger 2017). While this briefing provides a valuable list of factors the 
author believes is relevant to a country’s FDI security policy, it does not capture change over 
time, nor is it up to date. 
 The design of my index is inspired by the OECD Regulatory Restrictiveness Index 
(Kalinova et al. 2010), the policy analysis of “Acquisition- and ownership-related policies to 
safeguard essential security interests” (OECD 2020), and the EPRS briefing (Grieger 2017). I 
identified relevant legislation in each member state using both the European Commission’s List 
of Screening Mechanisms Notified by Member States (European Commission 2020b) and the 
OECD’s collection of notifications on investment policies related to national security.  Analysis 3
on the substance of the laws from 2000 to May 2019 is largely drawn from “Acquisition- and 
ownership-related policies to safeguard essential security interests” (OECD 2020). Analysis of 
the substance of laws passed after May 2019, of laws in countries not included in the OECD 
report, and of laws included in the European Commission’s list but excluded from the OECD 
report is entirely my own. Decisions about the coding for each member state and detailed 
citations are documented in Appendix B. Figure 1, on the next page, summarizes the coding 
rules. 
 The full list is available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/investment-3
policy-national-security.htm, under “Recent notifications of new policies.” 
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Figure 1. Coding Rules for the IFDI Security Restrictions Index (SRI) 
Primary Review I: Sensitivity 
0: The country has no IFDI screening mechanism or formal review process.  
The threshold for review is any investment in a sensitive sector that would grant a foreign 
investor: 
1: at least 50% ownership (voting right share) or controlling influence.  
2: at least 25% ownership or voting right share. 
3: at least 10% ownership or voting right share. 
4: at least 1% ownership or voting right share. 
Primary Review II: Compulsoriness 
0: The primary review is voluntary for all qualifying transactions. 
0.5: Mixed system: review is mandatory for some qualifying transactions, voluntary for others. 
1: The primary review is mandatory for all qualifying transactions. 
Primary Review III: Duration of Eligibility 
0: Screening possible only for planned or pending transactions.  
1: Post-transaction review is legal, and the government can “unwind” transactions.  
Breadth of Risk Conception 
0: Foreign investment is not explicitly restricted in any sector, or foreign investment is only   
 restricted in the defense sector, or there is no legal concept of sensitive sectors.  
0.5: Dual-use technology is the only civilian sector considered sensitive.  
1: Sensitive sectors include the supply of at least one critical resource or critical infrastructure. 
2: Sensitive sectors include the manufacturing, creation, or maintenance of critical technology. 
3: Sensitive sectors include the press or any firm that requires access to personal data.  
SOE Strategy 
0: State ownership in strategic sectors is not prevalent.  
0.5: State ownership is prevalent, but not explicitly justified by a security policy.  
1: State ownership is explicitly linked to security policy, and either the government actively 
pursues majority ownership in sensitive sectors or a golden share system ensures the government 
has a controlling influence without a majority investment. 
 Most countries that have any official IFDI security policy follow the two-stage risk 
management strategy I outlined earlier. The SRI centers on the primary screening mechanism 
because its criteria (unlike that of the secondary review) is publicly available in most countries. 
The SRI considers three facets of the primary screening mechanism that vary significantly across 
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states: the criteria used to trigger a secondary review, whether the review system is mandatory or 
voluntary, and the duration a transaction is eligible for review. The sensitivity of the primary 
review mechanism determines how applicable the entire system is. Voluntary systems put the 
burden on investors to declare risk, simplifying the process for most transactions at the cost of 
potentially missing some risky transactions, while a system of mandatory review is a higher 
administrative burden for investors and the government review agency, but is much more secure. 
Post-transaction or “ex post” review strengthens voluntary systems and allows the government to 
address a situation in which a particular becomes more risky over time, either because new 
information is revealed about the investor or because the government’s conception of risk 
changes.  
 The index also considers how broadly the state defines sensitive sectors and whether the 
state has a state-owned enterprise (SOE) policy that is linked to security. The breadth of risk 
conception measures how much of the economy is subject to FDI security screening: additional 
sensitive sectors mean the state is concerned about threats in many different areas. SOE policy is 
included because widespread state control in sensitive sectors makes screening redundant. Scores 
may range from 0 to 10, and countries are scored each year. A score of 0 means that the country 
has no IFDI restrictions due to security interests. Appendix A provides more detail on the 
specifics and rationale behind the coding rules, and Appendix B provides a thorough account of 
each country’s coding. 
  Throughout this paper, I use a metric called the SRI score as a measure of the scope of a 
country’s security restrictions on IFDI. To calculate the SRI score, I take the sum of the three 
primary review dimensions of the SRI, which measure the sensitivity, compulsoriness, and 
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duration of eligibility of a country’s primary review mechanism, and add that to the country’s 
breadth of risk conception score. Notably, it excludes the SOE dimension. Although SOE policy 
is related to the security policy of IFDI, it does not capture the restrictiveness of the IFDI system 
specifically. 
 In 2000, eight countries in my sample had a policy to address IFDI risk outside of state 
ownership. At the end of 2020, that number had increased to twenty one. Overall, the data 
confirms that FDI restrictions for national security reasons have been rapidly increasing across 
the EU, which is demonstrated in Figure 2.  
 Figure 3 shows the average SRI scores in the EU from 2000 to 2020. Across all 28 
member states in the past two decades, there were thirty instances of governments enacting 
significant policy change (laws that changed their country’s score on the index). Ten of these 
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Figure 2. Security Restrictions on IFDI over time
were laws passed in 2020. The uptick in scores in 2019 is directly caused by the EU Screening 
Regulation. 
 The SRI is designed to trace the proliferation of laws whose restrictions of IFDI are 
justified by security concerns. As such, it does not consider the application of the laws. Although 
the implementation of the each law doubtlessly has a huge impact on its real restrictiveness, such 
an assessment is beyond the scope of this paper. In this decision, I follow the precedent of the 
OECD RRI, which also bases its judgment of the laws as written, ignoring implementation 
completely (Kalinova et al. 2010). Like all indexes, the SRI sacrifices complexity for the sake of 
cross-national comparability. Nevertheless, the SRI is still useful. Its concise summary of 
national policies allows for cross-national comparison and the analysis of trends over time. I 
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Figure 3. Average SRI Score in all EU Countries, 2000-2020
further explore its utility in the quantitative section of this paper, but first, I turn to a discussion 
of IFDI policy at the EU level.  
The EU Screening Regulation 
 The only piece of EU-level legislation on IFDI security policy is the regulation 
establishing a framework for screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union 
(the Screening Regulation). In this section, I will analyze the Screening Regulation in detail. I 
have broken the functions of the regulation into three parts, which I will discuss sequentially: the 
screening guidelines, the cooperation mechanism, and the information-sharing rules. Then, I will 
explain its relationship with the SRI and analyze its implications for the regulatory space of the 
EU as a whole.  
 The main focus of the regulation is on the screening guidelines. Per this law, Member 
States governments have the final decision to both initiate and conduct the screening of any FDI 
in their country. The innovation of this law, then, is that it establishes a framework for screening, 
suggesting a model that member states may use or adapt. Thus, the framework defines key terms, 
bounding the scope of the regulation, and establishes a basic template for national screening 
mechanisms. 
 The European Commission proposed the regulation establishing a framework for 
screening of foreign direct investments into the European Union in September 2017. The 
proposed act then circulated the various legislative bodies in Member States, the European 
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions, and was approved by the 
Council and the European Parliament at their first reading. Regulation 2019/425 of the European 
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Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct 
investments into the Union, as it is formally called, was signed in March 2019 and entered into 
force on 11 October 2020. 
 Crucially, these screening guidelines limit the factors that may be taken into 
consideration in the screening process. In making a ruling, member states are permitted to take 
into account both the effects of the proposed FDI and the specifications of the foreign investor 
involved. The effect-side considerations include whether the FDI could affect critical 
infrastructure, critical technologies, or critical supplies, whether it requires access to sensitive 
information such as personal data, or if it could affect “the freedom and pluralism of the media” 
[Article 4.1]. Considerations regarding the investor themselves include the investor’s relationship 
to their government, their history of investment in other member states, and whether they are 
likely to be involved in “illegal or criminal activities” [Article 4.2]. Because of the EU-wide 
commitment to low barriers to FDI, this screening mechanism attempts to limit states’ denials of 
FDI to legitimate security concerns by restricting the factors that can be taken into consideration.  
 The second key innovation of this regulation is its establishment of a Cooperation 
Mechanism. The cooperation mechanism establishes rules to facilitate productive 
communication between member states and between the Commission and a member state in 
cases where a state or the Commission believes an instance of IFDI is likely to have detrimental 
effects. While activating the cooperation mechanism is voluntary, the host state of the IFDI is 
obligated to respond to requests for information and to “sincerely” take the opinion of another 
member state or of the Commission into consideration in their decision to reject or allow the 
investment transaction. The regulation establishes a timeline for this cooperation process and 
15
establishes the situations in which the Commission is allowed to provide an opinion. There are 
also detailed instructions outlining how the Commission and other member states can engage 
with a questionable instance of IFDI when the receiving state lacks a national screening process. 
 Outside of the screening framework and the cooperation mechanism, the rest of the 
regulation is devoted to laying out rules to facilitate documentation of the process and 
information sharing within the union, including with the public, in an attempt to increase 
transparency while also protect the sensitive information regarding both issues of national 
security and the privacy of investors.  
 The Screening Regulation does not define FDI using a threshold, but the European 
Commission uses the 10% voting rights threshold across its publications and within Eurostat. On 
the SRI, a 10% threshold earns a 3 on the primary review sensitivity dimension. Articles 7 and 8 
of the Screening Regulation allow member states and the EU to comment on “planned or 
completed” transactions in other states, but the regulation passes no judgment on whether 
screening should be voluntary or mandatory. On the SRI, that would be a 0 for compulsoriness 
and a 1 for duration of eligibility. Article 4 lists the factors Member States and the Commission 
may consider in passing their judgement on an investment’s impact on national security, which 
includes, among other criteria, what sector the investment concerns. The list of sectors in section 
1 would earn a 3 on the breadth of risk conception dimension. If all Member States were to enact 
national mechanisms in line with the template offered by the Screening Regulation, the SRI score 
of the entire EU would increase to at least a 7, which would be a significant increase from the 
EU’s average score at the end of 2020: 3.6.  
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 The Screening Regulation is significant in that it demonstrates an awareness of the 
security risks of IFDI at the EU level. The fact that it entered into force without issue shows the 
willingness of Member States to accept this security perspective on IFDI — or, at the very least, 
their resigned acquiescence (Reins 2019). Although the details of national screening mechanisms 
remain in the hands of member states, and it still not mandatory for member states to even have a 
screening mechanism, the fact that some level of cooperation and information sharing are 
mandatory is a significant policy shift for the EU.  
 From 2000 to 2020, the EU went from nearly zero national security-based restrictions on 
inbound FDI outside of state ownership to restrictions in 75% of member states and an EU 
resolution explicitly encouraging member states to adopt stricter security screening measures. In 
this part of the paper, I documented the dramatic change that has occurred in most of Europe 
over the past two decades. Thus, I accomplished the first goal of this thesis: to trace the change 
in policy. In the next part, I turn my attention to my second goal: to investigate the reasons this 
change occurred. 
The reasons for the shift in IFDI policy in the EU  
 Because academic research on this topic is relatively sparse so far, my goal is not to 
prove a certain cause, but rather to catalogue and analyze several potential causes. Most research 
and media coverage of this phenomenon points to the influx of Chinese investment as the 
primary reason for Europeans’ newfound skepticism over FDI. I identify two distinct types of 
this argument, one protectionist and the other geopolitical, and trace their distinct logics and 
evidence. I also discuss two other potential causes, one drawn from the varieties of capitalism 
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literature and the other from Jensen et al.’s 2012 work on the relationship between politics and 
FDI. In this section of the paper, I introduce and explain each of these arguments theoretically, 
linking them to qualitative evidence where relevant. Then, I describe the results of a simple 
random-effects regression model and attempt to adjudicate between these competing hypotheses.  
Hypotheses and qualitative analysis  
 Over the past two decades, Chinese FDI in Europe has significantly increased. The value 
of completed Chinese FDI transactions in Europe grew from 0.1 billion EUR in 2000 to a high of 
37.3 billion EUR in 2016 (Kratz et al. 2020). Chinese investment in Europe has declined since 
2017 due to a change in China’s domestic environment, but remains substantial, at 11.7 billion 
EUR in 2019 (Kratz et al. 2020). Many academics, think tank analysts, and journalists have 
linked the push for increased IFDI screening in the EU to this increase in investment activity 
from China. Although many analysts are vague about their precise reasoning, I have observed 
two distinct types of arguments about why China is the root cause of the European policy shift 
on IFDI.   
 I label the first type “protectionist.” In its simplest terms, the protectionist argument 
states that the economic relationship between China and the EU is deeply unfair, and FDI 
screening has been introduced primarily to address this imbalance. How is it unfair? The 
protectionist argument includes a variety of reasons, but the most common concerns center on 
the state sponsorship of Chinese investors, technology transfer, and the lack of reciprocity.  
 The EU has the very strict regulations to protect the fairness of the market and preserve 
competition, including a general prohibition on state aid by EU member states. Protectionists 
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argue that state-subsidized Chinese investors create unfair competition in Europe, as they do not 
have to abide by the same strict rules. Chinese investors with state sponsorship can make 
investments that their European counterparts cannot, the argument goes, because China will 
support its investors even if they are unprofitable.  
 China uses inbound and outbound FDI a means to accelerate its own technological 
development. European protectionists argue that Chinese investors are investing in European 
companies to gain access to their technology and expertise, export it to China, and leave the 
European company in the dust. These concerns are exacerbated by China’s poor track record on 
foreign intellectual property rights and the many accusations of China encouraging or sponsoring 
corporate espionage (see Pelligrino 2015; Cerulus 2018; Doffman 2019). 
 Finally, the protectionists take issue with the lack of reciprocity. Although the EU is open 
to foreign investment, China is mostly closed. In many cases, European investors are barred from 
investing in China or required to engage in strategic partnerships with domestic firms which 
require technology transfer.  
 Thus, the protectionist argument concludes, the increase of restrictions on FDI due to 
security concerns is a way to even the playing field in the short term and a bargaining chip in the 
long term, to be used to augment the EU’s bargaining power with China over intellectual 
property rights and reciprocity. (It is worth noting here that the EU and China launched 
negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty in early 2012, which they concluded in principle in 
late 2020.) If protectionism is the motivation, however, why would the EU and European states 
need to disguise their protectionism using the language of national security? The argument is not 
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precise about its causal mechanism, but I suspect that it largely stems from pride about the EU’s 
trade openness and other related diplomatic considerations. 
 The other argument, meanwhile, sees FDI through a geopolitical lens. In this argument, 
the creation and spread of IFDI security policy was the direct result of the increase in the EU’s 
genuine security concerns about China as a geopolitical rival. Most other large sources of 
inbound FDI in the EU are security allies of the EU or NATO, while China is “a rising 
superpower with a rapidly modernizing army, and with increasing geopolitical ambitions and 
declared foreign policy goals that are often at odds with those of European countries and their 
allies in North America and Asia” (Bickenback and Wan-Hsin 2018: 16). In this geopolitical 
argument, Chinese FDI in Europe does pose unique and real security threats, both directly and 
indirectly. In this argument, most Chinese investors are reduced to puppets of the Chinese state 
and the Chinese Communist Party.  
 Per this argument, China could use access to and control over information, critical 
infrastructure, and technology gained through FDI in an overt or covert attack against the EU. 
This is the most common direct security concern about all FDI, but proponents of the 
geopolitical argument assert that China is the greatest threat, whether because of the volume of 
its FDI in Europe or because of the magnitude of the perceived rivalry between the EU and 
China.  
 The geopolitical argument also worries about indirect security risk, the most threatening 
of which being that China could use threats to decrease FDI or promises to increase FDI to 
encourage European states to comply with its goals (Bickenback and Wan-Hsin 2018). (In the 
geopolitical argument, it is implied that China’s goals are necessarily opposed to the EU’s.) 
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Implicit in the geopolitical argument is the assertion that European countries are increasingly 
concerned about their national security because China has become more threatening since 2000. 
The increase in FDI screening mechanisms due to national security is a direct result of European 
countries’ concerns about China. 
 Of course, in practice, it is difficult to adjudicate between the protectionist and 
geopolitical arguments. A decision maker’s true intent is often impossible to ascertain, especially 
because issues of national security are often highly secretive. It is also possible that both 
arguments are true, and that the rise in FDI screening regulations has more than one cause. 
Nevertheless, I differentiate between the protectionist and geopolitical arguments to reveal their 
distinct theoretical differences. In the next few paragraphs, I highlight some of the evidence 
commonly cited as support for China’s causal role in the European IFDI policy shift, engaging 
with both the protectionist and geopolitical arguments as they relate to each point. I begin with a 
closer look at the policy development in Germany, then discuss two purported examples of the 
impact of Chinese investment on European politics. 
 I take Germany as a case study because it had three prominent Chinese investments that 
were reported in detail in the English-language media. Germany is an ideal case to illustrate the 
development of IFDI security policy: its SRI score increased by 7.5 points from 2000-2020, and 
German influence was instrumental in the development of the EU Screening Regulation, as I will 
discuss later. Although the German experience may not be generalizable, it is still illustrative.  
 In mid-2016, the Chinese appliance company Midea submitted a takeover bid for the 
German company Kuka, which designs and manufactures high-tech robotics. The bid, which was 
60% higher than the share price at the time, encountered resistance from some Germans, who 
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thought Kuka should remain German-controlled (Tsang 2016). Although the deal ultimately went 
through, the takeover of Kuka was allegedly a “turning point” in views on Chinese FDI (Ewing 
2020; Economist 2018b) and a “wake-up call” for German officials that “underlined the need to 
shield strategic parts of the economy” (Reuters 2020). A few months later, the Chinese company 
Fujian Grand Chip submitted a takeover bid for Axitron, a German semiconductor firm. 
Although the German government initially approved the bid, they rescinded their initial approval 
and reopened the review a month later. Germany’s Deputy Economic Minister cited “previously 
unknown security-related information” as justification for the government’s decision, although 
the journalists reporting this also noted increasingly loud “protectionist noises from Berlin” 
(Sheahan and Copley 2016). Eventually, the United States blocked the takeover of Axitron’s US 
assets on national security grounds, and Fujian Grand Chip withdrew its bid entirely (Wilkes 
2016).  
 In 2018, the German government tightened its FDI screening regulations, lowering the 
threshold to trigger a secondary review and expanding the definition of sensitive industries. 
Germany’s SRI score increased by 3.5 points, the biggest single increase in its history. That year, 
it took a much more aggressive stance on Chinese FDI, using the state-owned investment bank to 
block the acquisition of 50Hertz, an energy supplier, and threatening to use its veto to block the 
acquisition of Leifeld Metal Spinnings (Heller 2018).  
 The German experience from 2016-2018 reveals both the salience of the Chinese 
investment issue and the role of Chinese investment specifically in inspiring stricter IFDI 
regulations. In all cases I mentioned, the German government justified any anti-investment 
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measures with security concerns. Protectionist arguments, although present, did not seem to be 
dominant, at least as presented by the English news sources I used as my sources on the matter..   
 In 2016 and 2017, there were two cases where the EU failed to issue a statement critical 
of China because of a lack of unanimity. Many journalists and analysis attributed both of these 
cases to the influence of Chinese investment. In 2016, Hungary and Greece blocked an EU 
statement supporting a ruling against China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea 
(Economist 2018a). Hungary and Greece are both part of China’s Belt and Road initiative, in 
which China promised billions in investment. A Chinese investment company holds a majority 
share of Greece’s largest port, Piraeus. In 2017, Greece vetoed an EU statement criticizing 
China’s human rights record. “Greece’s decision was directly attributed to huge Chinese 
investments in the economically depressed country,” reported the Guardian, who broke the story 
(Smith 2017). To those who believe Chinese investment really is a security risk, these two cases 
directly exemplify a huge concern: Chinese direct investment hurting European cohesion on 
policy goals.  
 Overall, both the German example and the cases of the alleged impact of Chinese impact 
on EU policy cohesion illustrate support for the hypothesis that Chinese investment is the cause, 
or at least a cause, of the rise in security restrictions on FDI. More research is necessary to 
determine whether the ultimate causal mechanism is protectionist or geopolitical. However, it is 
possible that China is not the only cause. I briefly introduce two counter-hypotheses below.  
 The varieties of capitalism (VOC) literature suggests that there are structural differences 
between economic structures in developed countries and categorizes states into coordinated 
market economics (CMEs), liberal market economies (LMEs), and mixed economies. In CMEs, 
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the strength of labor, including the presence of union representatives on corporate boards, makes 
hostile takeovers less common and ameliorates the effects of shareholder capitalism (Huber, 
Petrova, and Stephens 2020). Following this logic, I hypothesize that CMEs will have stronger 
opposition to FDI and therefore be more restrictive. This hypothesis is somewhat similar to the 
protectionist argument about Chinese influence, but not specific to China.  
 Pooled means analysis indicates that CMEs, on average, have higher security restrictions 
on IFDI, as demonstrated in Figure 4, above. The grey dotted line represents the trend line for the 
entire sample of EU countries. 
 Another counter-hypothesis is drawn from Jensen et al.’s 2012 work on how partisanship 
influences FDI policy. They argue that Left governments are more likely to support IFDI in 
certain industries where it will benefit domestic labor, and right governments are more likely to 
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Figure 4. Average SRI Score in EU Member States, 2000-2020, by Variety of Capitalism
support IFDI in other industries, where it will benefit domestic capital. They do not discuss how 
their ideas could apply to the security side of FDI policy. However, they do demonstrate that Left 
governments tend to be associated with FDI in sectors that tend to be classified as sensitive, 
including critical infrastructure — electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications (Jensen et al. 
2012: 94). Thus, it follows that Left governments would be more opposed to security restrictions, 
which would negatively impact these sectors in particular.  
Quantitative analysis  
 Now that I have introduced the China hypothesis in detail and suggested two counter-
hypotheses, I turn my attention to quantitative analysis. In the next few paragraphs, I will discuss 
the operationalization of each hypothesis. Then, I will introduce, explain, and evaluate results 
from random-error regression models for each hypothesis to identify which hypotheses have the 
best, most robust qualitative support. Finally, I discuss what these statistics fail to show. 
 My ultimate goal is to understand what caused the rise in IFDI security policies in EU 
member states from 2000 to 2020. Across all countries in the EU in this time period, no state 
enacted or amended an SOE policy in response to IFDI concerns without also establishing or 
augmenting a primary review mechanism. Thus, I use a country’s total score on the SRI as the 
dependent variable throughout the quantitative analysis, but I exclude its score on the SOE 
dimension.  A country’s SRI score represents the scope of a country’s security policy on IFDI, 4
with 0 being no security policy and 9 being a very developed one.   
 The statistical models that included the SOE dimension were nearly indistinguishable from the 4
ones I report here. 
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 To test the influence of Chinese FDI, I use two different measures, one that corresponds 
to each type of argument that I detailed earlier. For the protectionist argument, I use bilateral 
investment data sourced from the OECD (OECD 2021), which counts inbound FDI stock in 
millions of US dollars. Investment stock represents the sum of all foreign investment in a 
country, which includes new investment, the reinvestment of equity, and debt. I use FDI stock, 
rather than FDI flows, because stock tends to be more stable over time and presents a fuller 
picture of the aggregate amount of investment in a country. For the sake of comparability, I 
normalize the FDI stock data by dividing by GDP. The GDP data was sourced from OECD 2019. 
 I include data on both Chinese stock and EU stock. For IFDI originating from the EU, I 
used the EU-25 aggregate for the years 2005-2006, the EU-27 aggregate for 2007-2012, and the 
EU-28 aggregate from 2013-2019. 
 Unfortunately, the OECD dataset excludes 5 EU member states — Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Malta, and Romania — and only ranges from 2005-2018. However, in this case, the 
OECD dataset is better than the alternatives. The Eurostat’s two FDI datasets, which range from 
2008 to 2012 and 2013-2018, are incomparable. The IMF’s IFDI data likewise covers all EU 
countries, but its most recent data is from 2012, before the biggest increases in IFDI restrictions 
on the SRI.  
 To measure the geopolitical argument for Chinese influence, I use Bailey, Strezhnev, and 
Voeten’s (2017) concept of ideal points and their accompanying dataset. An ideal point is a 
measure of “a state’s position on global issues” (Bailey et al. 2017:449) based on UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) voting data. Its validity rests on the assertion that “votes in the UNGA 
contain valuable information about the preferences of states” (Bailey et al. 2017: 448). I use the 
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ideal point distance from China (IPDISCHI) as a measure of the diplomatic closeness between an 
EU country and China in a given year. To calculate this for each UNGA session, I took the 
absolute value of the difference between each EU member state’s ideal point and China’s ideal 
point. The data is counted for the year in which the UNGA session began. General Assemblies 
begin in September and, although they can sometimes last into the spring, most voting takes 
place in the fall (Voeten 2013).  
 To test the varieties of capitalism hypothesis, I coded each country as either a LME, 
CME, or mixed. I use a dummy variable to separate the CMEs, coded 1, from the rest, coded 0. 
The list of countries’ classifications was derived from Hall and Soskice (2001) and Hall and 
Gingerich (2009), who consider Ireland and the UK to be LMEs and Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden to be CMEs. I classified all EU countries not 
explicitly listed in either book as mixed.  
 To test the partisanship hypothesis, I used annual cabinet share data from the 
Comparative Political Data Set (Armingeon, Engler, and Leemann et al. 2020), which includes 
the share of cabinet posts occupied by members of left, center, and right parties as a percentage 
of total cabinet posts. I use the data from 2000 to 2018, which is weighted by the amount of days 
the cabinet ministers were in office in a given year. The election statistics that form the 
foundation of the cabinet share data in Comparative Political Data Set is sourced from the annual 
releases of the Political Data Yearbook published by the EJPR, the ParlGov database (Döring and 
Manow 2018), and the work of Casal Bértoa (2016) and Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (2011). 
The classification of parties into left, right, and center was drawn from Schmidt (1996) and 
supplemented by the authors’ own calculations.  
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 To evaluate the validity of each hypothesis, I used random-effects regression in Stata. 
Simple OLS regression would not suit my panel data, as I suspect there are differences both 
across countries and over time. I chose random-effects over fixed-effects in order to consider the 
impact of time-invariant variables, a choice that was supported by Hausman tests. Below, I 
discuss the results of the bivariate and multivariate regressions for each hypothesis in turn. 
Interpreting the coefficients is difficult because they include both within-country and between-
country effects. In this case, where the goal is proof-of-concept, I will focus on statistical 
significance and the direction of effect. 
Figure 5. Random-Effects Regression of Total SRI Score (excluding SOEs)
I II III IV V VII
Chinese Stock 0.9900 *** 0.88 **
EU Stock -0.0002
Ideal Point Distance 
from China -1.20 *** -0.70 *
Coordinated Market 
Economy 1.15 0.99
Cabinet Share of Left 
Parties -0.001 -0.003
Constant 1.48 1.49 3.23 1.03 1.18 2.44
Rho 0.7792 0.7658 0.7360 0.6122 0.7568 0.7934
Prob > chi2 0.0007 0.9358 0.0000 0.0880 0.3810 0.0006
R2 within 0.0432 0.0005 0.0674 0.0000 0.0016 0.0662
R2 between 0.0085 0.1223 0.0434 0.1007 0.0131 0.0569
R2 overall 0.0036 0.0768 0.0008 0.0642 0.0005 0.0805
N (observations) 286 297 560 588 532 286
N (groups) 22 22 28 28 28 22
* = p <0.05, ** = p < 0.01, *** = p < 0.001.
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 In bivariate regression, Chinese FDI stock as a percent of GDP is statistically and 
substantively significant. EU FDI stock as a percent of GDP are not statistically significant. This 
indicates support for the hypothesis that increased IFDI from China has led to the increase in SRI 
scores. This is tentative support for both the protectionist argument for Chinese influence and the 
VOC argument (which I discuss in more detail later.)  
 The ideal point distance from China also has a statistically significant effect on SRI score. 
Its effect is negative, implying that an increase in ideal point distance from China (more 
disagreement in the UNGA) will lead to fewer IFDI restrictions. This goes against the 
predictions of the geopolitical hypothesis. A deep dive into ideal point data reveals that, for all 
countries, the ideal point distance is lower in 2019 than in 2000. Thus, either ideal point 
distances do not accurately capture the geopolitical rivalry in the EU-China relationship or 
geopolitical tensions have actually declined. Perhaps it is the case that the perception of tension 
between the EU and China has increased despite an overall improvement in their diplomatic 
relations. This would explain both the quantitative results and the plethora of journalists, think 
tank analysis, and academics who espouse the geopolitical argument using qualitative evidence.  
 Being a CME, according to the regression, had no statistically significant effect on SRI. 
However, as demonstrated by Figure 4 earlier in the text, pooled means analysis indicates that 
CMEs, on average, have higher security restrictions on IFDI. The bivariate and multivariate 
regressions did indicate that increased Chinese investment as a percent of GDP has a statistically 
significant effect on SRI score. Thus, perhaps the relationship between variety of capitalism and 
IFDI policy should not be written off so quickly. I believe this deserves more attention in future 
research.  
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 The cabinet share of left parties did not have a statistically significant effect in either the 
bivariate or the multivariate models. I found no support for the idea that Left parties tend to be 
more opposed to restrictions on FDI in traditionally-sensitive sectors. However, a more granular 
look at the intersection between parties and IFDI security policy might be more informative. For 
example, there could be a relationship between parties with a strong opposition to foreign 
influence or strong protectionist preferences and the introduction of IFDI security policy. 
Detailed assessments of the development of IFDI security policy in individual member states 
may also yield testable cross-national hypotheses.  
 My regressions models are too simple of a test to capture the nuances of such a broad, 
multi-national phenomenon, but they still yield informative results. They demonstrate the 
usefulness of a country’s SRI score as a dependent variable and provide compelling initial 
evidence for the hypothesis that Chinese IFDI is a primary cause for the increase in FDI security 
restrictions in the EU. They also raise more specific questions about the relationship between 
IFDI security policy and partisanship and IFDI policy and varieties of capitalism that future 
research can endeavor to answer.  
  
Conclusion  
 In this paper, I explored an emerging phenomenon in the EU: the rise of security 
restrictions on IFDI. I conducted (to my knowledge) the first complete, cross-national review of 
EU member states’ IFDI security policies and created the Security Restrictions Index (SRI), a 
quantitative measure of IFDI security policy restrictiveness. Using the SRI, I demonstrated the 
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increase in both the number of EU member states with IFDI security restrictions and the intensity 
of states’ IFDI risk identification and management policies. 
 I then discussed potential causes of this policy change. I first explored the popular 
hypothesis that increased Chinese investment is behind the change, including both its 
protectionist and geopolitical variants. I also touched on the potential effects of partisanship and 
varieties of capitalism. Then, I used a random-effects regression model to quantitatively assess 
these hypotheses. Chinese investment stock did have a positive and significant relationship with 
SRI score. Results for the other three hypotheses ran counter to their theoretical predictions or 
were statistically insignificant. 
 The rise in security restrictions on investment is a growing trend which deserves 
attention, all the more because it defies expectations. The EU was largely built on facilitating 
IFDI and has historically been a global leader in trade liberalization. Thus, the increase in 
skepticism around IFDI is particularly notable because it defies the EU’s traditional policy 
perspective. Moreover, Europe’s policy change runs counter to the predictions of the existing 
literature on FDI, which predominantly focuses on the ways states compete to attract FDI. The 
existing literature does not consider why a developed country would reject IFDI and largely 
writes off security concerns as unfounded. The rise of IFDI security restrictions across the EU 
reveals a gap in the contemporary understanding of FDI policy in developed countries. In 
illuminating the conflict between the EU’s new policies and the expectations of the literature, my 
work reveals an important avenue for further research. 
31
APPENDIX A: SRI CODING RULES 
This Index measures a government’s sensitivity to the security risk presented by FDI. The five 
dimensions each capture an aspect of a country’s IFDI security system. 
If a country has more than one primary review process (ie. a cross-sectoral review system and 
another system for especially sensitive sectors) or different thresholds for different types of 
sensitive sectors, I score the most restrictive system, excluding defense-only screening 
mechanisms.  
The SRI only considers federal-level legislation. 
Primary Review I: Sensitivity  
The determination of “foreignness” depends on whether the investor is a natural person or a legal 
person. While the specifics vary by state, the definition of a foreigner is broadly similar across all 
MS. 
In nearly all countries in this sample, a transaction will also be eligible for review if it grants the 
investor a “controlling influence,” regardless of ownership share. What counts as a “controlling 
influence” or “decisive influence” varies somewhat by country. This is included in the laws to 
avoid a situation wherein an investor declines voting rights but holds real managerial power over 
the company nevertheless.  
Primary Review II: Compulsoriness 
A qualifying transition is one that meets the threshold for consideration in a sensitive sector (as 
defined in “Primary Review I: Sensitivity” and “Breadth of Risk Conception”).  
Voluntary systems put the burden on investors to declare risk, simplifying the process for most 
transactions at the cost of potentially missing some risky transactions. A system of mandatory 
review is a higher administrative burden for investors and the government review agency, but is 
much more secure. 
The intermediate category exists for mixed systems, in which some other category (such as the 
particular nationality of the investor, for example) determines whether a particular transaction 
must be screened.  
Primary Review III: Duration of Eligibility 
Most screening mechanisms only examine planned or pending transactions. However, some 
governments have introduced the ability to retroactively examine transitions that have already 
been completed. This strengthens the system in two ways: first, it compliments a voluntary 
review system by increasing the incentives for investors to complete a pre-transaction review (so 
as to avoid a hassle later). Second, it allows the government to address a situation in which a 
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particular becomes more risky over time, either because new information is revealed about the 
investor or because the government’s conception of risk changes (due to external circumstances).  
Systems where only some transactions are eligible for ex-post review are coded as 1.  
Breadth of Risk Conception  
The defense sector is excluded from this system, as nearly all states have separate rules for 
military investment by foreigners. Dual-use technology gets a score of 0.5 because, by definition, 
dual use technology has military applications.  
Critical resources include water, power, energy, or land. Critical infrastructure includes the 
systems which distribute public utilities, such as water, power, or telecommunications 
infrastructure.  
Critical technology is defined in different ways by different states, but in general includes 
information systems, servers, or biotechnology. 
SOE strategy  
A “golden share” system allows the government ownership privileges with a minority 
investment.  
Many states use state ownership in sensitive sectors as a means to mitigate security risk. High 
amounts of state ownership in sensitive sectors can render an FDI screening mechanism 
redundant, which is why SOE strategy is included in this IFDI security restrictiveness index. 
Nevertheless, because the specific characteristics of state ownership is beyond the scope of this 
paper (and not its focus), this measure incredibly simplifies the nuances of state ownership.  
No countries in the EU introduced an SOE policy from 2000-2020. 
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APPENDIX B: SRI CODING BY COUNTRY 
I have used these two references to compile the list of all the laws included in the SRI:  
European Commission (2020), “List of screening mechanisms notified by Member States.” 
Version: 12 January 2021. https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/
tradoc_157946.pdf  
OECD (2020) “Acquisition- and ownership-related policies to safeguard essential security 
interests: Current and emerging trends, observed designs, and policy practice in 62 
economies.” Research Note by the OECD Secretariat, May 2020. http://www.oecd.org/
investment/OECD-Acquisition-ownership-policies-security-May2020.pdf 
Any additional country-specific references are included within each country’s entry.  
I have used parenthetical citations where appropriate. However, when talking about a law, which 
is difficult to cite in parentheses, the entire paragraph is drawn from my reading of the law in its 
unofficial English translation. If I am drawing on someone else’s interpretation of the law, I cite 
them in parentheses. 
OECD 2020 is the source for all OECD notifications under the Code of Liberalization, although 
they are publicly available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/investment-
policy-national-security.htm, under “Recent notifications of new policies.”  
What follows is a non-exhaustive list of national policies in alphabetical order.  
Austria 
 Before 2011, Austria had no policy related to the security of IFDI (OECD 2020: 119). 
 In December 2011, Austria amended its Foreign Trade Act, introducing its first 
restrictions on investment due to security concerns. Austria’s notification to the OECD (DAF/
INV/RD(2012)6) summarizes the changes and provides an English translation of the law. The 
amendment established a screening system: Investments in a sensitive sector that would grant 
25% or more voting rights to a foreigner require prior authorization from the Minister of 
Economy, Family and Youth. The amendment invokes TFEU Articles 52 and 65 (1) to define 
public policy and public security and provides a list of sensitive sectors, which include energy 
and water supply, telecommunications, transport, and schools. Transactions which are 
determined to present actual risk may be allowed if mitigation measures are adopted. If 
mitigation is impossible (or rejected), the government can refuse authorization of the transaction. 
2012 Notification to OECD under Code of Liberalization: 
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DAF/INV/RD(2012)6. “Measures having a bearing under the OECD Codes of Liberalisation and 
the National Treatment instrument.” Notification by Austria, 2 March 2012. https://one.oecd.org/
document/DAF/INV/RD(2012)6/en/pdf 
 In February 2013, Austria announced an amendment to the Austrian Foreign Trade Act of 
2011 to clarify the prior authorization requirement. According to the notification to the OECD, 
the amendment was “necessary on grounds of legal clarity after several months of practical 
experience in the implementation of the new provision” (DAF/INV/RD(2013)3). The 
amendment clarified various items of the bill (ie. the method used to calculate voting shares), 
defined several terms more clearly, and mandated the government inform the investor within one 
month of application whether an investigation has been opened. (If an investigation was not 
opened or the government did not issue a notice within one month, the transaction is approved.) 
This amendment did not affect Austria’s rating on the Index.  
2013 Notification to OECD:  
DAF/INV/RD(2013)3. “Investment Measure Relating to National Security.” Notification by 
Austria, 3 October 2013. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2013)3/en/pdf  
2013 version of Foreign Trade Act (unofficial English Translation) 
"Federal Act enacting the Foreign Commerce Act of 2011 (Außenwirtschaftsgesetz 2011 – 
AußWG 2011); Version of 8 March 2013.” https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/
tradoc_157940.pdf  
 In July 2020, Austria passed the Investment Control Act (ICA). The ICA updates the 
Austrian system in light of the EU FDI Screening Act (Regulation EU 2019/452), further 
clarifies the screening process, and strengthens the screening mechanism in three new ways. 
First, it establishes an “ex officio” authorization procedure which permits the authorities to open 
an investigation against an already-completed transaction. If the secondary review finds “well-
founded suspicion of a threat to security or public order (as defined in Section 3 of the ICA), the 
government is permitted to mandate mitigation measures or “unwind” the completed transaction. 
Second, the ICA lowered the trigger threshold for certain “especially sensitive sectors” from the 
acquisition of a 25% voting share to 10%. Finally, the ICA added “sensitive information” and 
“media freedom” to the list of sensitive sectors.  
Austrian Investment Control Act / ICA 
Bundesgesetz über die Kontrolle von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen 
(Investitionskontrollgesetz – InvKG), StF: BGBl. I Nr. 87/2020 (NR: GP XXVII RV 240 AB 276 




 Belgium has no federal mechanism to address FDI security (OECD 2020). Although 
there was a motion in the Belgian federal parliament in January 2019 to introduce an FDI 
screening mechanism (Peteghem 2019), Belgium has not notified the EU of any screening 
mechanisms (European Commission 2020).  
2019 Motion: 
Peteghem, Vincent Van (2019) “Voorstel van Resolutie tot het invoeren van een mechanisme 
voor de screening van buitenlandse investeringen in ondernemingen die actief zijn in strategische 
sectoren / Proposition de Résolution visant à instaurer un mécanisme de filtrage des 
investissements étrangers dans les entreprises opérant dans les secteurs stratégiques.” 17 January 
2019. DOC 54 3472/001. https://www.lachambre.be/FLWB/PDF/54/3472/54K3472001.pdf  
Bulgaria 
 Bulgaria has no policy to address FDI security (OECD 2020), and there are no screening 
mechanisms or restrictions on foreign investors (Kolev and Targov 2020). However, the 
government maintains strong holdings (or has a constitutionally-protected monopoly) in many 
strategic sectors, including energy and telecommunications (OECD 2020). The SOE policy 
appears to be at least partially motivated by security interests: for example, the Energy Act 
references safeguarding the security of the energy supply through the management decisions of 
the government in several places.  
Kolev, Nikolay and Trayan Targov. 2020. “Bulgaria.” The Foreign Investment Regulation Review 
- Edition 8. October 2020. Accessed 18 January 2021.  
Energy Sector Act. Consolidated version available for download at: https://
www.me.government.bg/en/library/energy-act-256-c25-m258-1.html. Accessed 25 January 
2021.  
Croatia 
 Croatia has no specific mechanisms to address FDI security, although its constitution 
specifically protects the state’s right to create restrictions on foreign investment due to security 
interests (OECD 2020).  
 Croatia maintains majority holdings in many firms in traditionally sensitive sectors, such 
as utilities, communications, and transport (OECD 2020), although its SOE policy does not 
appear to be explicitly linked to national security interests.  
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Cyprus 
 The Republic of Cyprus does not have any IFDI screening mechanism, although it does 
have blanket bans on foreign ownership in certain sectors, including in electricity production 
(United States Department of State 2019). I code this as a 1 on breadth and a 0 on all primary 
review criteria. Cyprus does maintain significant ownership in many enterprises, although it is 
unclear if this is motivated by security interests.  
United States Department of State (2019). “2019 Investment Climate Statements: Cyprus.” 
Accessed 25 January 2021. https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-investment-climate-statements/
cyprus/  
Czechia 
 The Czech Republic has no specific legislative mechanisms to address FDI-related risks 
to national security, although a law was brought to parliament in April 2020 that would introduce 
a mandatory screening mechanism for transactions in some sectors (like defense) and create the 
possibility of a government-initiated review of any transaction (OECD 2020). As of January 
2021, the proposed law does not appear to have cleared both houses of parliament.  
 The Czech government does use some state-ownership explicitly to mitigate risk in 
traditionally sensitive sectors, especially energy and utilities (OECD 2020).  
Denmark  
 In Denmark, the only mechanism related to FDI is the Danish Act on War Material, 
which requires all businesses engaged in the defense sector to be registered with the government, 
although foreign-owned businesses require additional authorization (OECD 2020). Restrictions 
on foreign investment in the defense industry have existed in Denmark since at least 1937 
(OECD 2020). 
 In 2018, the “Act on the continental shelf and certain pipelines installations on territorial 
waters.” introduced a review requirement for any business engaged in exploitation of the natural 
resources of the Danish coastline, including the laying of pipelines in Danish waters. A permit 
will only be issued if it is compatible with the kingdom's foreign, security and defense policy 
interests (§ 3a.2). Although this requirement applies to all investments, not only foreign ones, I 
code it as the definition of a sensitive sector outside of defense (but not as a formal screening 
process).  
2018 Act on the continental shelf and certain pipelines installations on territorial waters 
(The Danish Consolidated Act No. 1189 of September 21 2018) 
Lov om kontinentalsoklen og visse rørledningsanlæg på søterritoriet (LBK nr 1189 af 
21/09/2018) https://www.retsinformation.dk/eli/lta/2018/1189.  
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Kromann Reumert. “In brief: the key features of merger control legislation in Denmark.” Last 
updated July 31, 2020. https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5511400e-
c51d-4d03-9577-4d81e722b777 
 Denmark does use SOEs to manage security risk, including a legal obligation for its state-
owned energy infrastructure company to increase its market share wherever possible (OECD 
2020).  
Estonia 
 Although its constitution explicitly allows the imposition of restrictions on foreign 
investment on national security grounds, Estonia has no cross-sectoral screening mechanism for 
IFDI (OECD 2020).  
 In February 2018, Estonia passed the Real Estate Acquisition Restriction Act, which 
prohibits the acquisition of property by foreign persons in certain areas due to national security 
concerns. I code this as a 1 in risk conception, as it establishes that some resources (land in 
certain areas) are sensitive due to security reasons. 
Real Estate Acquisition Restriction Act 
Kinnisasja omandamise kitsendamise seadus. 8 February 2012. RT I, 23.02.2012, 11.  https://
www.riigiteataja.ee/akt/123022012011?leiaKehtiv  
 Estonia has significant state ownership in infrastructure and transportation (OECD 2020), 
although its decision does not appear to be explicitly linked to national security interests.   
Finland 
 The 1992 Act on supervision of foreigners' acquisitions screened all investments that 
granted a foreigner at least 1/3 of the votes (or a controlling interest) in a defense company, a 
firm with over 1,000 employees, or a firm with turnover or assets greater than 1,000 million 
marks (after 1999, €170 million*). Although it replaced an even more restrictive law from 1937, 
the 1992 Act is notable for its breadth: it mandated the screening of foreigners’ investments in all 
sectors. Investors were required to notify the government of a qualifying transaction, although 
the government only had the authority to stop pending transactions.   
1992 Act on the supervision of foreigners' acquisitions  
Lag om tillsyn över utlänningars företagsköp. 30.12.1992/1612. https://www.finlex.fi/sv/laki/
ajantasa/kumotut/1992/19921612  
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* Calculated based on the exchange rate at the time of transition to the Euro, taken from 
European Commission, n.d. “Finland and the Euro.” https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/euro-area/euro/eu-countries-and-euro/finland-and-euro_en.   
 In March 2012, Finland passed the Act on the Screening of Foreigners' Corporate 
Acquisitions, which established a new system for IFDI screening and repealed the 1992 Act. The 
2012 Act limited qualifying transactions to any investment in the defense sector and a 10% 
voting rights share in “any other such organization and business undertaking considered critical 
in terms of securing functions fundamental to society on the basis of its field, business or 
commitments” (DAF/INV/RD(2012)16: 4). Although this was less broad than the 1992 Act, it 
still meant a transaction in any sector could qualify (Wehrlé and Pohl 2016). Government 
approval for investment in defense is mandatory, but in all other sectors notification is voluntary. 
The government has 3 months to initiate a review after a transaction has happened, and another 3 
months to reach a decision to “confirm” the transaction. If the government finds actual risk, they 
can require the investor to divest all assets. 
2012 Notification to OECD by Finland: 
DAF/INV/RD(2012)16. ”Finland's Act on the Monitoring of Foreigners' Corporate 
Acquisitions.” Notification by Finland, 19 September 2012. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/
INV/RD(2012)16/en/pdf.  
Wehrlé, Frédéric and Joachim Pohl (2016). “Investment Policies Related to National Security: A 




 In 2019, Finland notified the OECD of three acts restricting foreign investment due to 
national security interests. Two of them establish restrictions on foreign investors’ acquisitions of 
real estate in certain areas, and the third extends the government’s right of redemption for the 
purpose of “safeguarding national defence, territorial integrity, government administration, 
border security, border control, maintenance of emergency stocks of critical supplies, the 
continued operation of the infrastructure necessary for the vital functions of society or other 
equivalent public interest” (Act on the Right of Redemption of Immovable Property and Special 
Rights in Order to Protect National Security § 2). The 2019 updates do not change Finland’s 
rating on the Index, but they are notable in that they give the government more power to enforce 
its screening rules. 
Notification to OECD: 
DAF/INV/RD(2019)8. “Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by Finland, 
14 October 2019. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2019)8/en/pdf. Includes 
unofficial translations of Act on Transfers of Real Estate Property Requiring Special Permission, 
39
Act on the State’s Right of Pre-emption in Certain Areas, and Act on the Right of Redemption of 
Immovable Property and Special Rights in Order to Protect National Security. 
 In February 2020, Finland amended the 2012 Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate 
Acquisitions to update the law in light of the 2019 EU Screening Regulation. It also extends the 
mandatory review requirement to critical infrastructure and critical services: companies which 
“produce or supply critical products or services related to the statutory duties of Finnish 
authorities essential to the security of society” (§ 4). Furthermore, the 2020 amendment 
establishes the legality of mitigation measures to control risk as an alternative to requiring 
divestment.  
Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2020, amendments 2.10.2020/682) 
Laki ulkomaalaisten yritysostojen seurannasta (172/2012). In Finnish: https://finlex.fi/fi/laki/
ajantasa/2012/20120172. Unofficial translation: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/
november/tradoc_159098.pdf 
 Finland does use state ownership, at least in some traditionally sensitive sectors, 
explicitly to manage risks to national security (OECD 2020).  
France 
 In 2000, foreign investment in France was subject to Law No. 66-1008 of 28 December 
1966 on financial relations with foreign countries, which declared that any foreign investment in 
France was eligible for “declaration, prior authorization, or control” due to security interests as 
determined by the Minister of Economy and Finance. It is unclear in this, or either of the OECD 
reports on this issue, how broadly this was applied. I have coded this system with a 0.5 for 
breadth of risk conception. The lack of a formalized system means a 0 for all three primary 
review dimensions.  
1966 Law: 
Loi n° 66-1008 du 28 décembre 1966 relative aux relations financières avec l’étranger (Law No. 
66-1008 of 28 December 1966 on financial relations with foreign countries). Version in force on 
January 31, 1967. https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/LEGIARTI000006637257/1967-01-31/
#LEGIARTI000006637257  
Technically, 1966 version was repealed in 2001 and replaced with https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/id/LEGIARTI000006645702/2001-01-01/, but the 2001 version 
appears identical to me.  
 In 2004, France instituted a mandatory review mechanism for any investment above 
33.3% by a foreigner in a list of sensitive sectors established in the law. These sensitive sectors 
are limited, broadly, to defense-related activities, such as arms production.  This mechanism 
appears to be somewhat more specific than its predecessor. The establishment of a formal, 
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codified screening process allows coding on the three primary review dimensions of the index. 
Because it is a prior authorization review, only planned or pending transactions are eligible.  
 In 2014, France expanded the list of sectors which require mandatory review, adding 
“transport, water, energy, electronic communications, public health, and activities of vital 
importance as specified in the Defense Code” (DAF/INV/RD(2014)6). The breadth of risk 
conception was scored accordingly.  
2014 Notification to OECD: 
DAF/INV/RD(2014)6. “Measure with a bearing on the National Treatment instrument,” 
Notification by France. 01 October 2014. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2014)6/
en/pdf  
 In December 2019, France adjusted the threshold for screening down to 25% voting 
rights share and augmented the list of sensitive sectors, including, notably, the media.  
Décret n° 2019-1590 du 31 décembre 2019 relatif aux investissements étrangers en France. 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000039727443/  
 In April 2020, France temporarily (for now) adjusted the threshold for screening down to 
10% in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD 2020).  
Unofficial English translations of all French legislation in force in March 2020: https://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/march/tradoc_158692.pdf 
 France does maintain SOEs in critical sectors, and it explicitly links its management to its 
security interests; furthermore, since May 2019, France introduced a golden share arrangement to 
further strengthen its ability to manage risk using its SOEs (OECD 2020).  
Germany 
 Although restrictions on foreign investment had theoretically been legal for some time, 
no specific mechanism was established until 2004, when Germany established a screening 
mechanism for the defense sector and certain dual-use technologies (OECD 2020). I give 
Germany a score of 0.5 for breadth of risk conception (dual-use technology) and 1 for primary 
review II: compulsoriness because of the prior authorization requirement. I give Germany a 0 for 
primary Review I: sensitivity because there was no formal screening mechanism. 
 An amendment to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act on 13 April 2009 created a cross-
sectoral review mechanism. Notification to the authorities of a transaction was voluntary, but the 
government could screen completed transactions for up to five months after their completion 
(DAF/INV/RD(2009)). Acquisitions of more than 25% share by foreigners in critical 
infrastructure were eligible for review. This increases Germany’s score on the Sensitivity 
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dimension to 2 and its score on the Breadth dimension to 1. The switch between a mandatory 
prior authorization system and a voluntary post-transaction review system  leaves Germany’s 
total score unchanged.  
2009 Notification:  
DAF/INV/RD(2009). “Notification Under Article 3 Of The Oecd Code Of Liberalisation Of 
Capital Movements,” Note from the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology on 
26 May 2009. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2009)4/en/pdf  
 In December 2018, Germany created a separate branch of its cross-sectoral review 
mechanism to apply stricter restrictions to certain highly sensitive civil sectors (DAF/INV/
RD(2019)1). Per this law, foreign investments which would confer at least a 10% voting share in 
critical infrastructure, critical technologies, or the popular media are required to notify the 
government of their transactions and subject to a primary review. Furthermore, the window for 
government investigation of a transaction was increased to 5 years at most. This increased 
Germany’s scores on both breadth and sensitivity to 3. The re-introduction of mandatory prior 
authorization for some transactions increases the mandatory section to 0.5. 
2019 Notification: 
DAF/INV/RD(2019)1. “Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by 
Germany, 13 February 2019. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2019)1/en/pdf  
 Germany passed several amendments to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and 
Ordinance in 2020, which updated the procedures in light of the EU Screening Regulation, 
strengthened both branches of the cross-sectoral screening mechanism procedurally, and 
responded to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example by permanently moving the biotechnology 
sector to the branch where the 10% threshold for mandatory screening apples (European 
Commission 2020). This did not change Germany’s position on the index. 
 Germany does keep significant state assets in critical infrastructure and energy and has 
used state ownership to block foreign acquisitions of critical infrastructure, most lately in 2018 
when it bought the energy company 50Hertz (OECD 2020). The acquisition of 50Hertz was 
explicitly justified by security concerns (Bryan and Heller 2018).  
Bryan, Victoria and Gernot Heller (2018). “Germany moves to protect key companies from 





 Greece, since 1990, has required prior authorization for the ownership of real estate in 
some parts of the country by foreigners, managed by the Ministry of Defense (OECD 2020). I 
code this as a 1 on breadth and a 0 on all primary review dimensions.  
The law (in Greek): https://www.kodiko.gr/nomothesia/document/28872/nomos-1892-1990  
Hungary 
 In 2018, Hungary passed the Law on the Control of the Foreign Investments that Violate 
the National Security of Hungary, which entered into force 1 January 2019. It was the first policy 
that explicitly addressed security risks presented by IFDI (OECD 2020). Per the law, all 
investments by a foreigner which confer at least a 10% voting share (at least 25% if not a private 
LLC) in certain sectors “important to national security” (DAV/INV/RD(2019)2: 2), which 
include dual-use technology, critical infrastructure (electricity, natural gas, etc.), and critical 
technology.   
Notification to the OECD:  
DAV/INV/RD(2019)2. "Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by Hungary. 
11 February 2019.  https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2019)2/REV1/en/pdf.  
Ireland 
 Ireland does not currently have any official restrictions on foreign investment due to 
security concerns (OECD 2020). However, according to a September 2020 press release from the 
Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment, the Irish parliament is considering a bill 
which would enable the government “to assess, investigate, authorise, condition, prohibit or 
unwind foreign investments from outside of the EU, based on a range of security and public 
order criteria.” This bill seems to be inspired by the EU Screening Regulation.  
Irish Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (2020). “Government agrees EU 
Regulation to screen Foreign Direct Investment.” Press Release, 13 September 2020. Accessed 
25 January 2021. https://enterprise.gov.ie/en/News-And-Events/Department-News/2020/
September/20200913.html  
Italy 
 Italy had a longstanding “golden share” system to manage risk to sensitive sectors via 
state ownership and special powers. In March 2012, this system was explicitly replaced by a 
“golden power” screening mechanism (OECD 2020). The new system required all investments in 
the defense sector (and certain dual-use technologies) be approved by the President of the 
Council of Ministers, and that all acquisitions in energy, transport, communications, and other 
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critical infrastructure by non-EU investors must likewise by notified (“Golden Power” n.d). In 
2014, several presidential decrees clarified the procedure and listed the activities which count as 
critical infrastructure. Italy’s notification to the OECD in 2013 clarifies that only transactions 
which confer a change in ownership are subject to review. I take this to mean a trigger threshold 
of 50% ownership (a majority takeover), in light of later laws which claim to reduce the trigger 
threshold. Thus, I have coded Italy’s regime as having a mandatory prior authorization 
requirement for foreign investment above 50% in critical infrastructure.  
“Golden Power.” (n.d.) Governo Italiano, Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (Italian 
Government, Presidency of the Council of Ministers). http://www.governo.it/dipartimenti/dip-il-
coordinamento-amministrativo/dica-att-goldenpower/9296  
Italy’s 2013 Notification to the OECD:  
DAF/INV/RD(2013)4. “Investment Measure Relating to National Security,” Notification by 
Italy, 27 September 2013. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2013)4/REV1/en/pdf.  
 In October 2017, Italy added critical technologies to the energy, transport, and 
communications review system and clarified the conditions for the government’s power to veto a 
transaction (DAF/INV/RD(2018)5).  
Italy’s 2018 Notification to the OECD:  
DAF/INV/RD(2018)5. "Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by Italy, 23 
October 2018. http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/
INV/RD(2018)5&docLanguage=En  
 In 2019, Italy added 5G telecommunications infrastructure to the sensitive infrastructure 
category (OECD 2020). This does not change its position on the Index.  
 In April 2020, Italy tightened its mechanism by reducing the trigger threshold for extra-
EU acquisitions to 10%; added additional sectors to the critical infrastructure review mechanism, 
and enabled post-transaction review of transactions which failed to submit the required 
notification (OECD 2020). According to Decreto-Legge 8 aprile 2020, Art. 15 sec.1, the 
additional sectors include those that are listed in the EU Screening Regulation, which include 
personal data and media pluralism. This significantly increases Italy’s score on the Index. In 
December 2020, Italy made this broader conception of sensitive sectors permanent (Decreto del 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 179 del 18 dicembre 2020, Art.1).  
Decree-Law 8 April 2020, n. 23.  
"Urgent measures regarding access to credit and tax obligations for businesses, special powers in 
strategic sectors, as well as interventions in the field of health and labour, extension of 
administrative and procedural terms." Art. 15-16 
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Decreto-Legge 8 aprile 2020, n. 23. “Misure urgenti in materia di accesso al credito e di 
adempimenti fiscali per le imprese, di poteri speciali nei settori strategici, nonché interventi in 
materia di salute e lavoro, di proroga di termini amministrativi e processuali.” Art. 15-16 
 In Italian: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2020/04/08/94/sg/pdf 
Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 179 of 18 December 2020 
Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 179 del 18 dicembre 2020 
In Italian: https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2020/12/30/20G00199/sg  
 With the abolishment of its golden share system in 2012, Italy no longer uses state-
ownership as a primary means to manage security risk (OECD 2020).  
Latvia 
 In March 2017, Latvia established a mandatory screening mechanism for all acquisitions 
which confer decisive influence to an investor in critical infrastructure, regardless of the 
investor’s nationality (OECD 2020). For the purposes of the index, I consider a 50% ownership 
share a decisive influence, as I cannot find any specific threshold mentioned in the law (DAV/
INV/RD(2018)1). It is important to note that Latvia’s mechanism is designed to manage all 
investment-related risk: it does not specifically apply to foreign investors. Nevertheless, I 
consider it a restriction on IFDI.  
2018 Notification to OECD:  
DAF/INV/RD(2018)1. “Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by Latvia, 
19 February 2018. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2018)1/en/pdf  
National Security Law, Chapter VI - Restrictions on Commercial Companies of Significance to 
National Security 
Nacionālās drošības likums. In Latvian: https://likumi.lv/doc.php?id=14011  
In English: https://likumi.lv/ta/en/en/id/14011-national-security-law (Translation validity: 
01.09.2017.–29.10.2018. Amendments not included: 04.10.2018.)  
Regulation No. 606 adopted on 3 October 2017 regarding the Information to be Submitted to the 
Authority Determined in the National Security Law and the Handling of Information on Foreign 
Direct Investments (6 October 2020) 
Noteikumi par Nacionālās drošības likumā noteiktajai institūcijai iesniedzamo informāciju un 
darbībām ar informāciju par ārvalstu tiešajiem ieguldījumiem (Noteikumu nosaukums MK 







 Latvia does use state ownership as a means to manage security concerns (OECD 2020).  
Lithuania 
 While Lithuania has had restrictions on foreign investment in the defense sector since 
1995 and mandated state control of critical infrastructure since 2002, a screening mechanism for 
foreign investment was not introduced until 2009 (OECD 2020).  
 The 2009 legislation established a formal screening mechanism for investments in 
defense or critical infrastructure, including the transport, energy, and telecommunications 
sectors, among others. Several amendments in 2018 and 2019 clarified the screening process, but 
made no changes which would affect Lithuania’s rating on the Index (OECD 2020). Whether a 
transaction is subject to a prior authorization mechanism or subject to a voluntary notification 
with the potential of post-transaction screening varies depending on the classification of the 
asset, although it seems that the threshold for mandatory review is a 25% voting rights share 
(DAV/INV/RD(2018)6). I have used the mandatory review system as the basis for Lithuania’s 
score on the Index.  
2018 Notification to OECD:  
DAV/INV/RD(2018)6. “Investment policy related to National Security,” Notification by 
Lithuania, 23 October 2018. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2018)6/en/pdf  
 State ownership is prevalent and explicitly linked to security concerns in several sensitive 
sectors (OECD 2020). 
Luxembourg 
 Luxembourg currently has no mechanisms in place to manage security concerns of IFDI 
(OECD 2020). Luxembourg does maintain some SOEs in traditionally sensitive sectors, such as 
energy and transport, although it is unclear if this policy is explicitly linked to its security 
interests (OECD 2020).  
Malta 
 In October 2020, Malta’s first law to manage security risks from IFDI entered into effect 
(ACT No. LX ACT of 2020). It established a prior authorization requirement for acquisitions by 
a foreign investor of 10% or greater ownership of a firm in a sensitive sector as defined by the 
EU Screening Regulation, which includes personal data and pluralism of the media.  
ACT No. LX of 2020 of 18 December 2020  
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ATT Nru LX tal-2020, 18 ta’ Diċembru, 2020. In Maltese and English: https://
www.parlament.mt/media/109955/act-lx-national-foreign-direct-investment-screening-act.pdf.  
 Malta has traditionally used SOEs to manage security risks in critical infrastructure 
(United States Department of State 2018), and it continues to hold assets for national security 
reasons (MIMCOL n.d.).  
United States Department of State (2018) “Malta,” 2018 Investment Climate Statements. https://
www.state.gov/reports/2018-investment-climate-statements/malta/  
MIMCOL (n.d). “About MIMCOL.” Accessed 26 January 2021. http://staging.mimcol.com.mt/
about/about-mimcol/. 
Netherlands 
 Since 1996 and 2000 (respectively), the Electricity Act and Gas Act governed the 
screening of foreign investments in critical infrastructure. Per the laws, any investor who would 
acquire control of a firm in one of these sectors must notify the government, who has the right to 
block the acquisition on national security grounds.  
Electricity Act 1998 (article 86f) 
Elektriciteitswet 1998 (artikel 86f). https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009755/2019-01-01  
Gas Act (article 66e) 
Gaswet (artikel 66e). https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011440/2019-01-01  
Ministerial Regulation regarding the notification of change of control Electricity Act 1998 and 
Gas Act 
Regeling melding wijziging zeggenschap Elektriciteitswet 1998 en Gaswet 
https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0032058/2012-10-09  
 In March 2020, the Netherlands passed the Telecommunications Act, under which a 
mandatory notification must be made if an investor would acquire decisive influence or greater 
than 30% of the shares of a firm in the telecommunications sector.  
Telecommunications Act (Chapter 14a) 
Telecommunicatiewet (hoofdstuk 14a) 
https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009950/2020-10-01/#Hoofdstuk14a  
Ministerial Decree regarding unwanted control telecommunication 
Besluit Ongewenste Zeggenschap Telecommunicatie 
https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0044118/2020-10-01  
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 As the Netherlands manages risk to critical infrastructure through these screening 
mechanisms, state ownership does not form a part of its security strategy (OECD 2020).  
Poland 
 Poland has restricted the acquisition of real estate by foreigners since at least 1920, and 
foreigners have been restricted from acquiring or managing Polish airports since 2002 (OECD 
2020). In both cases, foreigners must obtain prior authorization, which can be denied on national 
security grounds (OECD 2020). As in other countries with restrictions on foreign holding of real 
estate, I consider this a 1 on risk conception and a 0 on all primary review dimensions.  
 In July 2015, Poland passed the Act on the control of certain investments, which 
established a mandatory review process for any investor who would acquire control or decisive 
influence over a firm in certain sectors, which are mostly related to critical infrastructure (OECD 
2020). 
Act of July 24, 2015 on the control of certain investments 
Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 2015 r. o kontroli niektórych inwestycji. Dz. U. 2015 poz. 1272 (wraz z 
późniejszymi zmianami). In Polish: http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/DocDetails.xsp?
id=WDU20150001272 
Poland’s 2016 notification to the OECD: https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2016)1/
en/pdf  
 In June 2020, Poland updated its screening mechanism in light of the 2019 EU Screening 
Regulation and the COVID-19 pandemic in the “Act of 19 June 2020 on Subsidies on Interest on 
Bank Loans Granted to Entrepreneurs Affected by COVID-19 and on the Simplified Procedure 
for the Approval of Arrangements in Connection with COVID-19.” In its most notable changes, 
the Act expanded the list of sensitive sectors to include public health and personal data and 
legalized post-transaction screening for up to 5 years under certain circumstances.  
Act of 19 June 2020 on Subsidies on Interest on Bank Loans Granted to Entrepreneurs Affected 
by COVID-19 and on the Simplified Procedure for the Approval of Arrangements in Connection 
with COVID-19 
Ustawa z dnia 19 czerwca 2020 r. o dopłatach do oprocentowania kredytów bankowych 
udzielanych przedsiębiorcom dotkniętym skutkami COVID-19 oraz o uproszczonym 
postępowaniu o zatwierdzenie układu w związku z wystąpieniem COVID-19. Dz. U. poz. 1086. 
Unofficial translation: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/september/tradoc_158930.pdf  




 Prior to 2011, Portugal managed investment-related security risks to crucial infrastructure 
primarily through state ownership; however, in 2011, as part of a push toward privatization of 
SOEs, the government called for a screening mechanism to mitigate the risk of opening their 
critical infrastructure to investment (OECD 2020; DAF/INV/RD(2019)7).  
 In September 2014, the parliament passed a law establishing a screening mechanism for 
critical infrastructure (in energy, transport, and communication). All transactions in sensitive 
sectors in which a foreign investor would acquire control over the enterprise are eligible for ex-
post review by the government. A voluntary pre-transaction screening allows an investor to 
bypass the possibility of an ex-post review.  
2019 Notification to OECD:  
DAF/INV/RD(2019)7. “Investment policy related to national security,” Notification by Portugal, 
22 July 2019. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2019)7/en/pdf. (Includes English 
translation of the law).  
Romania 
 In 2011, Romania added an article to its merger control regulation which enables the 
review of a transaction which could threaten national security (Article 46(9) in the unofficial 
English translation of the 1996 Competition Law). The Supreme Council for National Defense 
manages the review and has established a list of sensitive sectors it considers eligible, which 
mostly consist of critical infrastructure (CSAT 2012). As a specific ownership threshold is 
unspecified, I assume review requires control or decisive influence and code the system 
accordingly.  
1996 Competition Law 
1996 Competition Law, Unofficial English Translation http://www.consiliulconcurentei.ro/
uploads/docs/concurenta/LEGEA_CONCURENTEI_Nr_21_eng_rev_1.pdf. Translation 
available from European Commission (2020), “List of Screening Mechanisms Notified by 
Member States.” 
CSAT (2012) “Consiliul Suprem De Aparare a Tarii Hotarare referitoare la aplicarea art. 46, alin. 
(9), din Legea Concurentei nr. 21/1996(Supreme Council of Defense of the Country Decision 
regarding the application of art. 46, para. 9 of the Competition Law no. 21/1996).” https://
csat.presidency.ro/files/documente/Hotararea_CSAT_73_(2012).pdf. Found in OECD 2020.  
 In 2020, Romania instituted a separate screening mechanism to manage security risks 
related to foreign acquisitions in the petroleum sector specifically (OECD 2020). This does not 
affect Romania’s score on the Index.  
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 Romania keeps significant assets under government control for security reasons (OECD 
2020). 
Slovakia 
 Slovakia does not currently have any dedicated policy to manage security risks related to 
IFDI, although adoption of measures in line with the EU Screening Regulation are planned 
(OECD 2020). Slovakia does have significant state ownership in traditionally sensitive sectors, 
which it uses to manage security risks (OECD 2020).  
Slovenia 
 In May 2020, Slovenia announced the ZIUOOPE Act, which establishes an IFDI 
screening system in Article 11 (European Commission 2020). Prior to this, Slovenia did not have 
any dedicated mechanism to manage security risks related to IFDI (OECD 2020).  
 The ZIUOOPE Act institutes a mandatory notification requirement for all foreign 
investors acquiring 10% or greater equity or voting share in a sensitive sector, the list of which 
draws directly from the EU Screening Regulation and contains both personal data and the 
pluralism of the media.  
ZIUOOPE Article 11 
“ZIUOOPE: Zakon o interventnih ukrepih za omilitev in odpravo posledic epidemije COVID-19 
(Act Determining the Intervention Measures to Mitigate and Remedy the Consequences of the 
COVID-19 Epidemic)”, Official Journal No. 80/20 (adopted 29 May 2020, in force as of 31 May 
2020). In Slovenian: http://www.pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPredpisa?id=ZAKO8206. Unofficial 
English translation: https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/october/
tradoc_158966.6.2020.pdf.  
   
 Slovenia does use state ownership to manage security risks, and has several majority 
holdings in critical infrastructure (OECD 2020).  
Spain 
 Spain has had restrictions on real estate acquisitions by foreigners in specific areas since 
1975, restrictions on foreign investment in mining since 1986, restrictions on foreign investment 
in the defense sector since 1993, and a cross-sectoral mechanism to manage security risk related 
to IFDI since 1999 (OECD 2020). Royal Decree 1999 established the right of the government to 
investigate (and unwind) the a foreigner’s acquisition of over 10% of the voting rights in a firm 
in any sector due to security concerns, although only certain limited categories of investments 
were required to submit to a prior approval mechanism. Even though review was technically 
possible in any sector, the ad hoc nature of this mechanism (and subsequent reforms which 
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expanded its scope) meant its breath was implicitly limited; accordingly, I code it as a 1 on 
breadth of risk conception.  
 In 2013, Spain introduced a separate review mechanism specifically governing foreign 
investments in the energy sector (OECD 2020), and in 2014, Spain introduced a separate 
screening mechanism for the telecommunications sector (European Commission 2020). Neither 
of these reforms changed Spain’s position on the Index.  
 The Royal Decree Law of March 2020 extended the mandatory prior approval 
requirement to sectors included in the EU Screening Regulation, which include personal data and 
media pluralism (OECD 2020).  
 It does not appear that Spain uses state ownership as a primary means to mitigate security 
risks.   
Sweden 
 Until 2020, Sweden did not have any specific mechanisms to manage security risk 
presented by foreign investment outside of the defense industry. It did once have legislation that 
restricted the acquisition of certain real estate by foreigners, but abolished this provision in 1992 
(OECD 2020).  
 In October 2020, Sweden passed a law to adapt the EU Screening Regulation to Sweden, 
establishing that the Inspectorate of Strategic Products (ISP) would be in charge of administering 
the regulation. In reading the governments’ various press releases, it is unclear to me whether 
Sweden currently has a screening mechanism or is only planning to implement one. However, 
according to the 2020 Decision of the Foreign Affairs Committee, which states that the ISP has 
the authority to review transactions according to the EU Screening Regulation, I have coded 
Sweden based on the details of the mechanism established in the EU regulation.  
Foreign Affairs Committee (2020) “Beslut: Kompletterande bestämmelser till EU:s förordning 
om utländska direktinvesteringar (Decision: Supplementary provisions to the EU regulation on 
foreign direct investment).” 30 September 2020. https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/
arende/betankande/kompletterande-bestammelser-till-eus-forordning_H801UU3.  
United Kingdom 
 The Industry Act of 1975 granted the UK government the authority to review a change in 
ownership of any manufacturing asset and, if it presented a risk to the national interest, either 
deny the change or acquire the asset itself (OECD 2020). However, specific guidelines regarding 
the use of these powers do not appear to exist, and the arrangement is allegedly “untested” 
according to a 2017 government report (OECD 2020:157). This does demonstrate some 
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conception of sensitive sectors, although the lack of development of the mechanism means a 
score of 1 on all primary review dimensions. 
 The 2002 Enterprise Act, which established the UK’s merger control system, allows for 
the review of a transaction that passes either the “turnover test” (the turnover of the enterprise 
exceeds 70 million GBP) or the “share of supply test” (the enterprise would comprise 25% of the 
share of supply of goods or services) (DAF/INV/RD(2018)7:2). Notification to the government 
is voluntary, and there are no separate rules for foreign investors. I consider this a 1 on the 
sensitivity of primary review, since the mechanism considers only transactions wherein 
ownership is conferred. It appears that this mechanism only applies to pending transactions and 
does not grant the power to unwind transactions.  
 In 2018, the government amended the Enterprise Act to reduce the eligibility criteria for 
dual-use technology and “advanced technology,” decreasing the turnover test criteria to 1 million 
GBP. The notification remained voluntary.  
2018 Notification: 
DAF/INV/RD(2018)7. "Investment Policy related to national security.” Notification by the 
United Kingdom, 23 October 2018. https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/INV/RD(2018)7/en/pdf  
 According to a 2019 speech by the Queen, the UK government is considering imposing a 
cross-sectoral mandatory screening mechanism for investment-related risks to national security 
(OECD 2020).  
 State ownership and golden share arrangements do form a primary means of managing 
investment-related risk to national security interests (OECD 2020). 
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